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Abstract 
This article explains how natural selection works and how it has 
been inappropriately applied to the description of cultural change. It 
proposes an alternative evolutionary explanation for cultural 
evolution that describes it in terms of communal exchange. 
 
When science is explained to the general public it is necessary to simplify. 
Inevitably details get left out, details that some consider important, and the 
‘sexy' parts of the story get played up. But so long as the overall picture is 
more or less right, scientists generally appreciate the efforts of popular 
science writers, the press, and in some cases their fellow colleagues, to 
make their work accessible to a wider audience. The public in turn benefits 
from the opportunity to see the world they live in from a new perspective, 
and consider questions they might not otherwise have considered. 
Sometimes, though, the baby gets thrown out with the bathwater. The 
‘babyless' version of a scientific story may be a hit nonetheless. Unless 
one has advanced training in a highly specialized area of a scientific 
discipline, it may appear to make sense. In most cases, the 
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misrepresentation of science doesn't make much difference; life goes on 
as normal. In some cases however, it changes the course of history. 
Such is the case with Richard Dawkins' (1976) portrayal of evolution. 
Dawkins is as successful a popularizer of science as the world has seen. 
He enchanted a generation with his lucid portrayal of evolution as 
competition amongst ‘selfish genes' and survival of the fittest. His books 
sparked applications of the theory of natural selection across the social 
sciences, yielding new sub-disciplines ranging from evolutionary 
economics, to Darwinian theories of culture and creativity, to neural 
Darwinism. The allure is understandable. Darwinism is a conceptual 
framework with considerable explanatory power. Were it possible to root 
these disciplines in a Darwinian framework, we might arguably have 
achieved the first step toward a unification of the social sciences 
comparable with Darwin's unification of the life sciences. But applications 
of Darwinian thinking outside of biology remain on the fringe of academic 
inquiry three and a half decades after publication of The Selfish Gene. The 
story of how applications of Darwinism in the social sciences flourished 
and wilted, and Dawkins' role in this, is one of the most fascinating stories 
in the history of science. 
How Natural Selection Works 
Let's take a brief look at how evolution works, and then at how Dawkins 
portrayed it. What necessitated Darwin's theory of how species evolve 
through natural selection is that traits that are acquired by an organism 
over its lifetime are not transmitted to offspring, and thus not passed down 
through time. Thus, whereas a rock that smashes stays smashed, a rat 
whose tail is cut off does not give birth to rats with cut-off tails; the rat 
lineage loses this trait. So the paradox faced by Darwin and his 
contemporaries was the following: how do species accumulate change 
when traits acquired over each organism's lifetime are obliterated? 
Darwin's genius was to explain how species adapt over time despite that 
new modifications keep getting discarded, by looking from the level of the 
individual to the level of the population of interbreeding individuals. He 
proposed that part of an organism is retained (the part we now call DNA). It 
is responsible for traits shared by relatives, and it undergoes random 
change from one generation to the next. Darwin realized that individuals 
who are better equipped to survive in their given environment leave more 
offspring (are ‘selected'). Thus, although their acquired traits are discarded, 
their inherited traits (often the traits they were born with) are not. Since 
random changes to inherited traits that are beneficial cause their bearers to 
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have more offspring, over generations, such traits proliferate at the 
expense of detrimental ones. Over generations this can lead to substantial 
change in the distribution of traits across the population as a whole. 
We now know that the reason that acquired traits are discarded is that 
organisms replicate not by mere self-copying, but self-copying using a set 
of genetic instructions made of DNA. In his 1966 book Theory of Self-
Reproducing Automata, John von Neumann, one of the most brilliant 
mathematicians who ever lived, studied the work of early geneticists and 
worked out the minimal algorithmic structure capable of evolving through 
natural selection. The result is the gold in the innermost chamber of one of 
the most fascinating intellectual puzzles in the world. Those who seek to 
understand natural selection or to apply Darwinian thinking to disciplines 
outside of biology without ever grasping von Neumann's basic insights are 
susceptible to all manner of pseudoscientific misadventures. 
What von Neumann (1966) showed is that DNA forms a self-assembly 
code that gets used in two distinct ways. One way it is used involves 
actively deciphering the instructions to construct a highly self-similar 
‘variant'. In this case, the code functions as interpreted information. The 
second way is as a self-description that is passively copied to the replicant 
to ensure that it can reproduce. In this case, the self-assembly instructions 
function as un-interpreted information. (To put it more loosely, the 
interpreting of the code can be thought of as ‘now we make a body', and 
the un-interpreted use of the code as ‘now we make something that can 
itself make a body'.) Von Neumann refers to a structure that evolves 
through natural selection as a self-replicating automaton. 
Von Neumann's book had a profound influence on John Holland, and led 
to Holland's invention of the genetic algorithm, or GA: a computer 
algorithm that embodies the abstract structure of natural selection (Holland, 
1975). The GA solves complex problems by randomly generating variant 
solutions and selectively ‘mating' the best for multiple ‘generations' until a 
satisfactory solution is found. In his 1975 book where the GA was 
introduced, titled Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, Holland 
proposed three fundamental principles of natural selection. Since biological 
evolution is the evolutionary process we know the most about, and the 
process that inspired this analysis, it is easiest to explain these principles 
in terms of how they apply to biology. The idea, however, is that they apply 
to any system -- biological or otherwise -- that undergoes Darwinian 
evolution. 
The first is sequestration of inherited information. The self-assembly code 
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is copied -- without interpretation -- to produce sex cells or gametes during 
meiosis. If gametes unite to form a germ cell, their DNA is decoded-
interpreted-to synthesize the proteins necessary to assemble a body. The 
process by which this unfolds is referred to as development. The DNA self-
assembly code, i.e. the information that gets inherited, is said to be 
sequestered because it is encoded in self-assembly instructions and 
shielded from environmental influence. 
The distinction between these two ways of using a self-assembly code, 
one enabling gamete production and the other enabling development, 
leads to the second principle: a distinction between genotype and 
phenotype. The genotype of an organism is its genetic constitution: the set 
of genes it inherited from its parents. The phenotype of an organism is its 
observable characteristics or traits, including morphological, developmental, 
biochemical, physiological, and behavioral traits. Phenotypes result 
through the expression of an organism's inherited genotype in the context 
of its environment. Phenotypes are altered -- they acquire traits -- through 
interaction with an environment, while genotypes generally do not.   
This leads to Holland's third principle: natural selection incorporates not 
just a means by which inherited variation is passed on (e.g., you may have 
inherited your mother's blue eyes), but also a means by which variation 
acquired over a lifetime is discarded (e.g., you did not inherit your mother's 
tattoo). What gets transmitted from parent to offspring is sets of self-
assembly instructions, and these instruction sets have not changed since 
they were formed. So traits acquired by parents during their lives, including 
learned behavior and knowledge, are not inherited by offspring. Since 
acquired change can accumulate orders of magnitude faster than inherited 
change, if it is not getting regularly discarded, it quickly overwhelms the 
population-level mechanism of change identified by Darwin; it ‘swamps the 
phylogenetic signal'. Thus natural selection only works as an explanation 
when acquired change is negligible. 
In sum, building on von Neumann's pioneering insights, Holland identified 
three basic principle of natural selection: (1) sequestration of inherited 
information, (2) a clear-cut distinction between genotype and phenotype, 
and (3) no transmission of acquired traits. Chris Langton, who initiated the 
field of artificial life, points to the same three principles (Langton, 1992). 
The ‘Selfish Gene' View of Evolution 
At the same time as Holland was writing his book, Dawkins was writing 
The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 1976). In it he took the gene-centric view of 
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evolution developed by George C. Williams, W. D. Hamilton, and John 
Maynard-Smith, and reformulated it in a way as that sparked the 
imagination of the general public. 
The basic idea is that biology is best understood by looking at the level of 
not the organism, nor the group, but the gene. A gene, according to 
Dawkins, is a replicator, which Dawkins defines as "any entity in the 
universe which interacts with its world, including other replicators, in such a 
way that copies of itself are made" (Dawkins, 1976; p. 17). A replicator is 
said to have the following properties: 
• Longevity - it survives long enough to replicate, or make copies of 
itself.   
 
• Fecundity - at least one version of it can replicate. 
 
• Fidelity - even after several generations of replication, it is still almost 
identical to the original. 
 
Replicators cause the entities that bear them to act in ways that make 
them proliferate. For example, our genes cause us to act altruistically 
toward others such as close relatives who share those genes. 
That's pretty much it. Note that none of the three basic principles of natural 
selection identified by Holland play any role in the replicator concept. Note 
that the replicator concept, unlike the concept of a self-replicating 
automaton, does not explain why acquired traits (such as your mother's 
tattoo) are not passed on, but inherited traits (such as your mother's blue 
eyes) are. Note that the replicator concept does not address the paradox 
that caused Darwin to come up with the theory of natural selection in the 
first place: the paradox of how species become increasingly adapted to 
their environment despite that changes acquired by an organism during its 
lifetime are not transmitted to offspring. 
Dawkins suggested that replicators appear not just in biology but also in 
culture, and he christened these cultural replicators memes. Memes, like 
genes, are said to evolve through a Darwinian process. Dawkins writes: 
"Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from 
body to body via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the 
meme pool by leaping from brain to brain." 
Reaction of Biologists 
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Other than those who profited from Dawkins' popularization of their ideas, 
most leading evolutionary biologists, particularly Stephen Jay Gould, Niles 
Eldredge, Richard Lewontin, Ernst Mayr, Carl Woese, Freeman Dyson, 
and Stuart Kauffman, were unreceptive to Dawkins' ideas (Dyson, 1999; 
Fracchia & Lewontin, 1999; Kauffman, 1999; Mayr, 1996; Sterelny, 2007; 
Temkin & Eldredge, 2007; Woese, 2004). Ernst Mayr, one of the foremost 
evolutionary biologists of the 20th century, claimed that the replicator 
notion is "in complete conflict with the basics of Darwinian thought". I once 
had the interesting experience of driving Ernst Mayr, who was almost 100 
years old at the time, from UCLA to a place an hour and a half away. He 
was charming, but the mere mention of Dawkins unsettled him so much 
that I thereafter avoided discussion of anything related to him. Stuart 
Kauffman describes Dawkins' ideas as "impoverished", and claims that the 
replicator concept does not capture the essential features of the kind of 
structure that evolves through natural selection. 
Incredibly, although theoretical biologists appear to find Dawkins so wrong 
that his ideas are almost unworthy of scientific scrutiny, many social 
scientists believe him to be so right that his ideas don't need scrutiny! 
Though leading biologists such as Lewontin and Eldredge published 
papers on the misapplication of Darwinism to culture, by the time they did 
so the floodgates had already opened, and cultural Darwinism was 
flourishing (Aunger, 2000; Blackmore, 1999). Social scientists of all stripes 
were tantalized by the prospect that Darwinism would turn their discipline 
into a ‘real science'. Dawkins also revived interest in evolutionary 
epistemology, a subfield of philosophy based on the idea that knowledge 
evolves through a process of conjecture and refutation. 
Memes and the Darwinian Theory of Culture 
Let us now examine the idea of analyzing culture in terms of memes and 
natural selection. Culture involves the social transmission of novel behavior, 
such as gestures, songs, or tool-making skills, amongst individuals who 
are generally members of the same species. Elements of culture spread 
both vertically, from one generation to another, and horizontally amongst 
members of a generation. Thus two key components of culture are a 
means of generating novel behavior, and a means of spreading it, such as 
imitation and other forms of social learning. 
It has been argued that culture constitutes a second evolutionary process, 
one which, though it grew out of biological evolution, exhibits an 
evolutionary dynamic in its own right that cannot be reduced to biology. 
Some of what is considered cultural behavior can be explained by biology. 
	   7 
However most would probably concede that, much as principles of physics 
do not go far toward an explanation of, say, the vertebrate body plan 
(though things like gravity play some role), biology does not go far toward 
an explanation of, say, the form and content of a sonnet (though factors 
like selective pressure for intelligence play some role). Most would 
concede that to explain how and why such forms arise, accumulate, and 
adapt over time, one must look to culture. Not only does culture 
accumulate over time, but it adapts, diversifies, becomes increasingly 
complex, and exhibits phenomena observed in biological evolution such as 
niches, and punctuated equilibrium. Like biological evolution, culture is 
open-ended; there is no apparent limit to the variety of new forms it can 
give rise to. 
So the notion that culture evolves appears to make sense. But the 
Darwinian approach to culture, and in particular the application of Dawkins' 
replicator concept, is problematic. The problem is that a Darwinian 
explanation only works when acquired change is negligible. Otherwise, as 
explained above, acquired change, which can operate strategically and 
instantaneously, quickly drowns out inherited change, which operates 
randomly and only operates at the transition between one generation and 
the next. Since the theory of natural selection assumes that variation is 
randomly generated and acquired change is not transmitted, to the extent 
that transmission is biased from random, and ideas acquire change 
between transmission events as we contemplate them, a Darwinian 
framework is inappropriate. (Some apply the term 'Lamarckian' to culture, 
but having seen that different people interpret this term differently I have 
come to avoid it.) The only way to maintain a Darwinian perspective on 
culture that is consistent with the algorithmic structure of natural selection 
is to view humans as passive imitators and transmitters of prepackaged 
units of culture, which evolve as separate lineages. To the extent that 
these lineages ‘contaminate one another' -- that is, to the extent that we 
actively transform elements of culture in ways that reflect our own internal 
models of the world, altering or combining them to suit our needs, 
perspectives, or aesthetic sensibilities -- natural selection cannot explain 
cultural change (Gabora, 2004, 2008, 2011). In order for something to stick 
in memory we first relate it to what else we know, make it our own, but a 
Darwinian framework for culture is incompatible with this. 
Dual inheritance theory is a version of the Darwinian view that posits that 
humans have two inheritance systems, biological and cultural (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985). Proponents of this theory go even further than Dawkins 
and the 'memeticists'; they say that natural selection does not even require 
self-replication. They not only throw the baby out with the bathwater, they 
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scour away any of the baby's dead skin cells clinging in the soap scum. 
Dual inheritance theorists focus on processes that bias the transmission of 
cultural information, such as the tendency to preferentially imitate high 
prestige individuals. But since natural selection assumes that variation is 
randomly generated, to the extent that transmission is biased from random, 
it is not due to selection, the mechanism Darwin identified; therefore a 
Darwinian approach actually gives a distorted model. The use of the term 
dual inheritance to refer to both what is transmitted genetically and what is 
transmitted culturally is technically incorrect and misleading. That which is 
transmitted through culture falls under the category of acquired change, 
not inherited change. Advocates of dual inheritance theory apply 
phylogenetic methods, developed for classifying biological organisms into 
lineages, to cultural artifacts. This works well for highly conserved 
assemblages, but falsely classifies similarity due to horizontal exchange of 
ideas as similarity originating from a common ancestor. 
The limitations of the applications of Darwinism to the social sciences that 
were inspired by Dawkins' picture of evolution can be seen most clearly by 
returning to what necessitated the theory of natural selection in the first 
place. Natural selection, a theory of population-level change, was put 
forward to account for the paradox that acquired traits are (with few 
exceptions) not inherited from parent to offspring. Note how exceptional 
this is. In most domains of human inquiry, change is retained, and 
successive changes accumulate. If an asteroid crashes into a planet, the 
planet cannot revert to the state of having not had the asteroid crash into it. 
But in the biological domain where, if a rat loses its tail the rat's offspring 
are not born tail-less, how does one explain how change is retained and 
accumulates? That was the extraordinary paradox Darwin faced, the 
paradox for which natural selection provided a solution. An analogous 
paradox does not exist with respect to culture. 
So How Does Culture Evolve? 
Dawkins has gone out of his way to emphasize that (1) by ‘selfish' he didn't 
mean that genes are really selfish, they just act as if they were, (2) humans 
can transcend their ‘genetic selfishness'. Nevertheless, using natural 
selection, a theory based on competition and survival of the fittest, to 
explain not just biology but also culture is not a promising route to 
explaining many aspects of human behavior such as cooperation. 
It turns out, however, that there is an evolutionary theory that is better 
equipped to explain these aspects. I will leave detailed discussion of this 
for another blog, but mention briefly that this other theory of cultural 
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evolution is inspired by recent efforts to understand the structure of the 
very earliest entities that could be said to have been alive (Gabora, 2006; 
Vetsigian, Woese, & Goldenfeld, 2007). These earliest life forms were not 
self-replicating automata. One could say they were replicators, but they did 
not have genes (selfish or otherwise). They were self-organized metabolic 
networks that evolved through a sloppy non-Darwinian process involving 
transmission of acquired traits, referred to National Medal of Science 
winner Carl Woese and his colleagues as communal exchange. 
It has been proposed that, like these earliest life forms, culture evolves 
through a non-Darwinian process of communal exchange. What evolves 
through culture is worldviews, the integrated webs of ideas, beliefs, and so 
forth, that constitute our internal models of the world, and they evolve, as 
did early life, not through competition and survival of the fittest but through 
communal transformation of all (Gabora, 1998, 1999, 2000, Gabora & 
Aerts, 2009). In other words, the assemblage of human worldviews 
changes over time not because some replicate at the expense of others, 
as in natural selection, but because of ongoing mutual interaction and 
modification. Elements of culture such as rituals, customs, and artifacts 
reflect the states of the worldviews that generate them. The theory is 
consistent with network-based approaches to modeling trade, artifact 
lineages, and the social exchange of knowledge and beliefs, as well as 
with the unexpectedly high degree of cooperativity in human culture. 
A cultural Darwinist recently asked me if it were not possible that two 
processes are operating interactively: the non-Darwinian process that I 
have focused on, and another process that, even if they are not strictly 
Darwinian, operate through a selection-like mechanism. The answer is a 
highly qualified yes, for given that the non-Darwinian process works 
strategically at the speed of thought, and selection works on randomly 
generated variation over generations, the first will render the second 
negligible. In fact many factors in the universe work together to give the 
patterns of culture we observe, everything from day length to microbes to 
weather. Science involves isolating a little piece of reality that you think is 
important to the explanation of a particular phenomenon. The scientific 
process has a deductive part, which takes smarts but it's pretty 
straightforward, and an inductive part, which some say takes intuition and 
creativity. Deciding which aspects of reality to include and leave out of your 
model is a matter of induction. How one goes about this reveals how 
thoroughly one has thought through the myriad factors related to the 
phenomenon being modeled. One could indeed decide to include 
selection-like processes in a model of culture, and this might produce a 
more nuanced model. But since selection-like processes operate without 
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strategy, orders of magnitude slower than strategic thinking and communal 
exchange, this is not a reasonable place to start building a model of culture. 
I expect one would get more bang for their buck by incorporating weather 
patterns. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Given that Dawkins introduced the replicator notion after von Neumann 
introduced the self-replicating automaton, and given that the replicator is a 
rather misleading cartoon of the original, how did it become so much better 
known? We will never know, but perhaps it's partly a matter of presentation. 
The replicator concept is simple, and if you don't think too deeply about it, 
it appears to have considerable explanatory power. Even the word 
‘replicator' itself is catchy; the phrase ‘self-replicating automaton' seems 
clunky by comparison. 
Personality may have something to do with it too. I once met Dawkins at a 
conference at Cambridge and spent several hours sitting across the table 
from him discussing science. In the company of scientists he came across 
as arrogant, defensive, and unsure of himself. In the media, however, he 
comes across as quite the opposite: astute, charismatic, and completely 
believable in his role as an ‘Oxford scientist'. I imagine that in such 
situations he is surrounded by people whose concern is not his science so 
much as his public image as a scientist. He plays the role to perfection, 
and has successfully increased public awareness of, and perhaps even 
passion for, science. By comparison, von Neumann's book on self-
replicating automata was written for a mathematical audience, and 
published posthumously, and von Neumann was more concerned with 
political ramifications of science than with public awareness of science. 
Perhaps also, his role in the development of the atomic bomb deters some 
from probing more deeply into his life and ideas. 
Dawkins' latest book, The God Delusion, has made even more of a stir 
than his books on evolution. I find it unfortunate that attention is diverted 
from the purely scientific arguments to the rather fruitless (in my opinion) 
debate about science versus creationism. I haven't read the new book, but 
it came up now and then at a biweekly meeting of some of the world's top 
scientists and theologians on creativity in the mind, the universe, and 
nature at Harvard Divinity School, that I was part of in 2009. The 
impression I got from both scientists and theologians is that he has again 
crafted a good read, but it is told through a lens that filters out key pieces 
of the story that would have given it quite another shape. I suppose that 
once his sights became set on reaching a popular audience, coming up 
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with simple, satisfying stories about how science works became his job. He 
does what he can, and leaves it to future generations of science writers to 
scour untapped realms of meme-space and rescue forgotten babies 
floating in their bathwater. 
Acknowledgments 
 
The author is grateful for funding from the Natural Sciences and Engineering 
Research Council of Canada. 
 
References 
 
Aunger, R. (2000). Darwinizing culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Blackmore, S. J. (1999). The meme machine. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. (1985). Culture and the evolutionary process. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dyson, F. (1999). Origins of life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Fracchia, J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1999). Does culture evolve? History and 
Theory, 38, 52-78. 
Gabora, L. (1998). Autocatalytic closure in a cognitive system: A 
tentative scenario for the origin of culture. Psycoloquy, 9(67).  
  
Gabora, L. (1999). Weaving, bending, patching, mending the fabric of 
reality: A cognitive science perspective on worldview 
inconsistency. Foundations of Science, 3(2), 395-428.  
 
Gabora, L. (2000). Conceptual closure: Weaving memories into an 
interconnected worldview.Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
901, 42-53.  
 
Gabora, L. (2006). Self-other organization: Why early life did not evolve 
through natural selection. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 241, 443-450. 
Gabora, L. (2008). The cultural evolution of socially situated cognition. 
Cognitive Systems Research, 9, 104-113. 
	   12 
Gabora, L., & Aerts, D. (2009). A model of the emergence and evolution 
of integrated worldviews. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 53, 434-
451. 
 
Gabora, L. (2011). Five clarifications about cultural evolution. Journal of 
Cognition and Culture, 11, 61-83. 
Holland, J. (1975). Adaptation in natural and artificial systems. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Kauffman, S. (1999). Darwinism, neoDarwinism, and the autocatalytic 
model of culture: Commentary on Origin of Culture, Psycoloquy, 10(22), 
1−4. 
Langton, C.G. (1992). Life at the edge of chaos. In C. G. Langton, C. 
Taylor, J. D. Farmer & S. Rasmussen (Eds.) Artificial life II. Boston: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Mayr, E. (1996). What is a species, and what is not? Philosophy of Science, 
63, 262-277. 
Sterelny, Kim (2007), Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest, 
Cambridge, U.K.: Icon Books.  
Temkin, I. & Eldredge, N. (2007). Phylogenetics and material cultural 
evolution. Current Anthropology, 48, 146-153. 
Vetsigian, K., Woese, C., & Goldenfeld, N. (2006). Collective evolution and 
the genetic code. Proceedings of the New York Academy of Science USA, 
103, 10696-10701. 
Von Neumann, J. (1966). The theory of self-reproducing automata. 
University of Illinois Press, Chicago. 
 
Woese, C. R. (2004). A New Biology for a New Century. Microbiology and 
Molecular Biology Reviews, 68, 173-186. 
